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INTEREST  OF A M IC I CURIAE1
Professor Joshua A. Douglas and Professor 
Michael E. Solimine are election law experts who 
have a particular interest in  the procedural aspects 
of election litigation.
Professor Douglas is the Robert G. Lawson & 
William  H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Kentucky College of Law. He teaches 
courses in  Election Law,
Constitutional Law, and Supreme Court Decision 
Making. He is the co-author of an election law case 
book and has written  numerous articles on the topic, 
including several regarding the procedural aspects of 
election law cases.
Professor Solimine is the Donald P. Klekamp 
Professor of Law at the University of Cincinnati 
College of Law. He teaches Election Law, Civil 
Procedure, Complex Litigation, and Federal Courts. 
He is also a co-author of an election law case book 
and has written  scores of articles, including several 
specifically about the three-judge district court 
process.
Civil Procedure,
Professors Douglas and Solimine are filing  this 
brief because they have a keen interest in  ensuring 
that the federal courts employ the proper procedure
Petitioners and respondents have filed blanket consent letters 
w ith the Court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici 
state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in  whole or 
in part and that no person or entity other than amici and their 
counsel contributed monetarily to the preparation or submission 
of this brief.
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in  election law cases, as doing so helps to resolve 
these disputes in  a manner that best comports with  
the unique aspects of the electoral system. This brief 
explains why district courts should not use the 
pleading standard from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (2009), in  making the threshold 
determination whether to refer a redistricting case to 
a three-judge district court. Relying on Professor 
Douglas’s and Professor Solimine’s experience and 
expertise in  this area, i t  describes the history of the 
three-judge district court and explains the strong 
legal and policy reasons why Congress intended for 
three-judge district courts to resolve redistricting 
cases. The single district judge here improperly 
dismissed this case without referring i t  to a three- 
judge district court.
3
INTRODUCTION  AND  
SUMMARY  OF ARGUMENT
This is a case about election law procedure. 
Although seemingly arcane, the question presented is 
vitally  important to the proper handling and 
resolution of election disputes in  federal court. I f  this 
Court does not correct the district court’s decision, it  
would set a dangerous precedent that would have 
significant negative consequences for the proper 
functioning of the electoral system.
There are two primary reasons to reject the 
single district judge’s refusal to refer this case to a 
three-judge court.
First, the district court failed to follow this 
Court’s precedent when i t  construed the sufficiency of 
the plaintiffs’ complaint under the Twombly and 
Iqbal pleading standard instead of determining 
whether the plaintiffs’ claims were “obviously 
frivolous.” The single district judge believed that the 
plaintiffs’
gerrymandering failed the plausibility standard of 
Twombly and Iqbal; but those cases apply to a 
complaint’s factual allegations, not to its legal 
contentions. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
This Court said so explicitly (and unanimously) in 
Johnson v. City of Shelby, holding that a district 
court may not dismiss a complaint for an “imperfect 
statement of the legal theory supporting the claim 
asserted.” 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam). 
Instead of invoking Twombly and Iqbal, the single 
district judge was required to determine whether the 
plaintiffs’ claims were “obviously frivolous.” Goosby
oflegal contention partisan
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v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973). Because asserting 
unlawful partisan gerrymandering under the First 
Amendment is not obviously frivolous under this 
Court’s decision in  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004), the district judge should have referred the 
matter to a three-judge court.
Second, the single district judge’s failure to 
comply with  precedent is inconsistent with  the 
policies that Congress sought to implement when 
enacting the Three-Judge Court Act. Although 
Congress restricted the jurisdiction of three-judge 
district courts in  certain areas, it  explicitly retained 
it  for redistricting cases given the importance of the 
disputes, the particular concern for timeliness, and 
the desire to create a tribunal that can render 
decisions seen as legitimate and devoid of ideological 
taint. Refusing to refer these cases to three-judge 
courts, and instead allowing a single judge to decide 
the merits, w ill thwart these important policy goals.
The district court went beyond its authority in 
dismissing this case on the merits. This Court 
should reverse the Fourth Circuit’s affirmance of the 
district court’s decision as contrary to both precedent 
and the historical and policy goals of the Three-Judge 
Court Act. Doing so w ill help to streamline the 
resolution of redistricting disputes.
ARGUMENT
I. The Single  D is tr ic t  Court Judge  E rred  In  
F a ilin g  To Refer This  R ed is tric ting  Dispute  
To A  Three-Judge  D is tr ic t  Court.
The single district court judge in  this case 
improperly applied the Twombly/ Iqbal pleading
5
standard and erroneously found that the plaintiffs’ 
complaint failed to state a claim under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Instead, the district 
judge should have determined whether plaintiffs’ 
claims were “obviously frivolous.” I f  the district court 
had applied the correct standard, it  would have 
denied the motion to dismiss and referred the case to 
a three-judge district court.
A. A  D is tr ic t  Court Judge  May  Refuse To 
Refer a Q ua lify ing  Case To A  Three- 
Judge  C ourt Only  I f  The Claim  Is 
“ O bviously  Frivo lous.”
The Three-Judge Court Act provides that “ [a] 
district court of three judges shall be convened . . . 
when an action is filed challenging the 
constitutionality of the apportionment of 
congressional districts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
This Court has recognized only limited exceptions to 
that mandate. In  Goosby v. Osser, this Court 
unanimously held that a single district judge to 
which the case is in itia lly  assigned may refuse to 
convene a three-judge district court only when the 
claim is “wholly insubstantial,” which the Court 
equated with  being “obviously frivolous.” 409 U.S. 
512, 518 (1973).
The term  “obviously frivolous” has special 
meaning in  the context of the Three-Judge Court Act. 
This Court has explained generally that a legal claim 
is “frivolous” where “ [none] of the legal points [are] 
arguable on their merits.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 
U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (quoting Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)). A  complaint is “frivolous” 
only “where i t  lacks an arguable basis either in  law
6
or in  fact.” Ibid. In  the context of the Three-Judge 
Court Act, an even higher bar applies for dismissing 
a case before referring i t  to a three-judge panel. As 
this Court has explained, the complaint must not 
only be frivolous, but “wholly insubstantial” and 
“obviously frivolous.” Goosby, 409 U.S. at 518. “The 
lim iting  words ‘wholly’ and ‘obviously’ have cogent 
legal significance.” Ibid. The words “import that 
claims are constitutionally insubstantial only i f  the 
prior decisions inescapably render the claims 
frivolous; previous decisions that merely render 
claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not 
render them insubstantial for the purposes” of the 
Three-Judge Court Act. Ibid, (emphasis added).
The “obviously frivolous” standard sets a low bar 
because, as this Court explained long ago, the 
determination as to whether to convene a three-judge 
district court serves the principal purpose of ensuring 
that the panel has subject-matter jurisdiction. See 
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933) (per curiam) 
(explaining that “the District Judge clearly has 
authority to dismiss for the want of jurisdiction when 
the question lacks the necessary substance and no 
other ground of jurisdiction appears”); see also 
 ̂ Stratton v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 282 U.S. 10, 13, 18 
(1930) (holding that a single judge may dismiss a 
case that warrants a three-judge district court only 
for lack of jurisdiction). Accordingly, a single judge is 
not “authorized” to dismiss a case on the merits, no 
matter what “his opinion of the merits might be.” Ex 
parte Poresky, 290 U.S. at 31; see also Idlewild  Bon 
Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 
(1962) (per curiam) (a single judge may not “decide 
the merits”).
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B. The D is tr ic t  Court Judge  Im prope rly  
Invoked  The Twombly/Iqbal Pleading  
Standard.
The district court failed to apply the “obviously 
frivolous” standard because i t  wrongly imported the 
pleading rules from Bell Atlantic Corp. u. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009), to determine whether to refer this case to 
a three-judge district court. Twombly and Iqbal, 
however, do not apply to the question of whether a 
claim is “obviously frivolous,” “wholly insubstantial,” 
or lacking federal court jurisdiction, which are the 
only bases to deny convening a three-judge district 
court. See Goosby, 409 U.S. at 518. Moreover, 
Twombly and Iqbal require courts to consider the 
factual plausibility of a pla intiffs  complaint, not the 
legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs  arguments. But the 
district court here did not hold that the plaintiffs’ 
facts were insufficient. I t  stated, instead, that it  
believed the plaintiffs’ legal arguments were 
unmeritorious. Twombly and Iqbal provide a poor 
framework for testing the legal sufficiency of a 
redistricting claim.
In  Twombly, this Court held that, in  deciding a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court should 
consider whether the complaint includes facts that 
render the asserted claim “plausible.” 550 U.S. at 
557. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. 
Only “factually suggestive” complaints are sufficient. 
Id. at 557 n.5. Two years later, this Court in  Iqbal 
reaffirmed that a complaint may not simply assert 
conclusory statements and instead must present
8
well-pleaded factual allegations that “plausibly give 
rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
679.
Importantly, in  neither of these cases did the 
Court hold that a pla intiffs  legal contentions must 
meet the plausibility standard. To the contrary, just 
last year this Court held unanimously that Twombly 
and Iqbal do not apply to a plaintiffs  legal 
assertions. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 
(2014) (per curiam). In  Johnson, this Court, in  
summarily reversing a lower court’s dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6), explained that Twombly and Iqbal 
“concern the factual allegations a complaint must 
contain to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 347 
(emphasis added). “Federal pleading rules call for ‘a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief; they do not 
countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect 
statement of the legal theory supporting the claim 
asserted.” Id. at 346 (citing FED. R. ClV. P. 8(a)).
Johnson’s logic applies with  particular force in
Election law cases, 
including redistricting disputes, are typically poor 
vehicles for applying the Twomblyllqbal standard. 
The facts are often not in  dispute and the ultimate 
question is the legal implications of the undisputed 
facts. See Joshua A. Douglas, Election Law Pleading, 
81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1966, 1986 (2013) (“Twombly 
and Iqbal therefore do not help much in  the 
redistricting context: there is little  need for a ‘factual 
plausibility’ showing when a p la in tiff already knows 
all of the facts to state a claim but must establish 
that those facts w ill lead to legal liability.”).
the election law context.
9
The district court here dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
First Amendment claim not because of a failure to 
present sufficient factual content but because of a 
perceived deficiency in  the legal argument regarding 
whether the First Amendment can support their 
claim for unlawful partisan gerrymandering. No one 
disputes that the plaintiffs have presented sufficient 
facts regarding Maryland’s redistricting, 
question is the legal implication of those facts. The 
single district court judge thus erred in  refusing to 
convene a three-judge district court based on a 
disagreement with  the plaintiffs’ legal theory.
C. The P la in tiffs ’ Claims Are  Not 
Obviously  Frivolous.
To dismiss this case without convening a three - 
judge district court, the single district judge would 
have had to conclude that the plaintiffs’ suit is so 
insubstantial and frivolous that there can be no 
doubt that precedent would completely foreclose their 
claims. See Goosby, 409 U.S. at 518. The district 
judge here did not—and under this Court’s precedent 
could not—reach that conclusion.
The plaintiffs base their claim for partisan 
gerrymandering on the First Amendment. They 
assert that Maryland’s redistricting plan burdens 
their First Amendment rights of political association 
by gerrymandering congressional districts along 
political lines. Regardless of the ultimate merits of 
the claim, this Court has explicitly left the door open 
to this argument. Refusing even to allow a three- 
judge district court to consider the claim is contrary 
to this Court’s invitation—per Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306—
The
10
18 (2004)—for litigants to suggest judicially
manageable standards in  this area.
In  Vieth, four Justices found claims of partisan 
gerrymandering nonjusticiable, four Justices offered 
a variety of standards, and Justice Kennedy, whose 
opinion was the narrowest ground for decision, stated 
that he would “not foreclose all possibility of judicial 
relief i f  some limited and precise rationale were 
found to correct an established violation of the 
Constitution in  some redistricting cases.” Id. at 306 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in  the judgment). 
Justice Kennedy noted, “ [t]hat no such standard has 
emerged in  this case should not be taken to prove 
that none w ill emerge in  the future.” Id. at 311. He 
also pointed explicitly to the First Amendment as a 
likely  source of a judicially manageable standard: 
“The First Amendment may be the more relevant 
constitutional provision in  future cases that allege 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.” Id. at 
314.
As
The district court was therefore incorrect in  
construing Vieth as “holding” that claims of partisan 
gerrymandering are nonjusticiable and thereby 
rendering the plaintiffs’ claim frivolous or wholly 
insubstantial. See Pet. App. 17a—20a. There were 
only four votes in  Vieth for holding all future partisan 
gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable. Because of 
Justice Kennedy’s narrower conclusion, plaintiffs  are 
free to offer judicially  manageable standards that 
might convince the Court that there is a path to 
judicial oversight of partisan gerrymandering. 
Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion in  essence invites
11
future litigants  to consider the First Amendment as a 
possible source of a judicially  manageable standard.
That is exactly what the plaintiffs did here. 
Refusing them the opportunity to present the 
argument to a three-judge district court would 
thwart the potential of a judicially  manageable 
standard ever emerging. Under the district court’s 
ruling, no single judge would ever send a claim for 
partisan gerrymandering to a three-judge district 
court because of the mere possibility that these 
claims are always nonjusticiable under Vieth. This 
would present a tangible harm to redistricting 
litigation  and to any future effort to locate a 
judicially  manageable standard. Moreover, as this 
Court stated in  Goosby, “previous decisions that 
merely render claims of doubtful or questionable 
merit do not render them insubstantial for the 
purposes” of whether to convene a three-judge 
district court. Goosby, 409 U.S. at 518. Even i f  the 
plaintiffs’ legal argument is doubtful under Vieth, the 
district court should still have convened a three- 
judge tribunal to consider the merits.
Under the Three-Judge Court Act, it  is not up to 
a single judge to decide whether a plaintiffs  legal 
claims have merit. The district court’s overreach in  
deciding the merits of this dispute requires reversal 
and the convening of a three-judge court.
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The D is tr ic t  Court Judge’s Fa ilu re  To Refer 
This  Case To A  Three-Judge  Court Is 
C ontra ry  To Congressional In te n t  And  
Raises S ign ifican t Policy  Concerns.
The permissive “obviously frivolous” standard 
under the Three-Judge Court Act is rooted in  
compelling policy considerations that favor having 
redistricting cases decided by three judges at the 
district court level. The district judge’s decision in  
this case contravenes Congress’s careful policy 
judgments.
A. The “ O bviously  Frivo lous”  Standard  Is 
Tied  To Congressional In te n t  And  The 
H is to ry  O f The Three-Judge  Court Act.
Congress created the three-judge district court as 
a reaction to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), 
which held that state officials could be sued in  
federal court for enforcing allegedly unconstitutional 
state laws, notwithstanding that the state itself could 
not be named in  the suit as a result of the Eleventh 
Amendment.
controversy, as i t  permitted constitutional attacks to 
be launched in  federal court against Progressive Era 
legislation, as opposed to raising those issues as 
defenses to enforcement actions in  state court. So 
controversial was the decision that proposed 
legislation sought to strip federal courts of their 
jurisdiction to hear such actions. But those proposed 
bills never became law and, in  1910, Congress settled 
on a “less drastic remedy.” 17A Charles Alan Wright, 
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4234 (3d ed. 
2007).
II.
The decision aroused great
13
The remedy consisted of requiring “the 
convening of extraordinary tria l courts composed of 
three judges in  certain kinds of cases,” with  a direct 
appeal available to this Court. See generally David 
P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in 
Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1, 2 
(1964). The court consisted of the district judge 
before whom the case was originally assigned, plus a 
circuit judge and another judge (typically another 
district judge) who the Chief Judge of the circuit 
would select.
There were several, interrelated reasons 
Congress created this unique procedure for Ex parte 
Young-type actions. I t  was thought that such actions 
were important and complicated, and that they 
raised unique federalism concerns, so that the 
consideration of injunctive relief should not be in  the 
purview of a single district judge. The presumably 
greater faculties and deliberation of three minds 
should be brought collectively to bear on the 
question. Congress also believed that there would be 
greater public acceptance of the decision i f  three 
federal judges rendered i t  rather than just one. And 
the provision for a direct appeal would allow for 
speedy resolution of the matter by this Court. 17A 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4234; Currie, 32 U. 
CHI. L. Rev. at 5—7; Joshua A. Douglas, The 
Procedure of Election Law in  Federal Courts, 2011 
UTAH L. rev. 433, 458—63. Congress thought enough 
of the virtues of a three-judge district court that, in  
succeeding decades, it  expanded the court’s 
jurisdiction to encompass other weighty and 
controversial matters, including constitutional 
challenges to federal statutes (in 1937) and
14
declaratory judgments under the preclearance 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act (in 1965).
Although some critics of three-judge courts 
suggested that they unnecessarily burdened the 
federal judiciary, see Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 
567—69 (1928) (Brandeis, J.), Congress has seen the 
need to retain them for certain important cases such 
as redistricting disputes. In  the early and mid-1960s, 
the concern with  administrative burdens—on lower 
court judges in  convening a three-judge panel for 
tr ia l court litigation, and on this Court in  disposing of 
mandatory direct appeals—became more pronounced 
as the number of such cases increased. See Michael 
E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in 
Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MlCH. J. L. Ref. 79, 
137—38 this. 1—2 (1996) (showing large numbers of 
three-judge court cases in  district courts, and decided 
on direct appeal in  this Court, in  the 1960s and 
1970s).
among judges, and in  the practicing bar, called for 
the abolition of the three-judge court, or at least the 
significant curtailment of its  jurisdiction, 
example, in  a leading article, Professor David Currie 
argued that “consuming the energies of three judges 
to conduct one tria l is prima facie an egregious waste 
of resources” and that the numerous direct appeals 
from these courts were an unnecessary exception to 
this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction. Currie, 32 U. 
Ch i. L. Rev. at 2, 74.
Yet crucially, many authorities also argued that 
Congress should leave the three-judge district court 
intact for certain narrow categories of cases. 
Professor Currie suggested, for instance, that the
As a result, many critics, in  academia,
For
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benefits of the court might still be appropriate for 
“ [r]ace-relations and reapportionment cases, [which] 
have caused a good deal of friction between the states 
and the courts.” Id. at 75. In  its Study of the 
Division Between Federal and State Courts, the 
American Law Institute  argued that the “image of 
the federal courts as a barrier against liberal state 
legislation [had] long since disappeared,” but that 
“other controversies” had arisen that had led to 
“strained relations” between federal courts and the 
states. American Law Institute, Study of the 
Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal 
Courts, 48—56, 319 (1969). The Study referred 
explicitly to cases arising under the Equal Protection 
Clause, including reapportionment disputes. Id. at 
319-21.
These arguments informed Congress’s 
reappraisal of the three-judge district court in  the 
1970s. The Judiciary Committees held extensive 
hearings on the topic in  the first half of that decade, 
with  many prominent judges, lawyers, and academics 
testifying both in support of and against lim iting  the 
jurisdiction of the three-judge court. See Michael E. 
Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of 
the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PlTT. L. Rev. 
101, 141—44 (2008). To give one illustrative  example, 
U.S. Court of Appeals judges Henry Friendly and J. 
Skelly Wright both testified in  support of curtailing 
the court’s jurisdiction in  general but maintaining it  
for reapportionment cases in  light of what they 
considered the “public importance” and the need for 
“public acceptance” of those decisions. Id. at 142.
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This legislative consideration culminated in  the 
1976 Amendment, which abolished the court except 
for reapportionment cases and certain other cases 
that Congress explicitly designated. See Act of 
August 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 
(codified in  part at 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)). The House 
and Senate Judiciary Committee reports 
acknowledged the administrative concerns critics had 
raised, but the reports determined that the 
“importance” of redistricting cases warranted 
retaining the three-judge district court for these 
disputes. S. Rep. No. 94-204, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988, 1991; H.R. Rep. No. 94­
1379, at 4 (1976). 17A Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4235.2 Congress’s decision to keep the 
three-judge court for redistricting cases was thus a 
carefully considered choice. That choice would be 
undermined i f  a single district court judge could 
dispose of a redistricting case on the merits without 
the benefits of referring the case to a three-judge 
panel.
B. Strong  Policy  Reasons Counsel In  
Favor O f H aving  Three-Judge  Courts  
Decide  R e d is tric ting  Cases.
Redistricting cases are not ordinary civil 
disputes with  typical pleading rules. They are a
2
The 1976 Amendment did not purport to curtail certain 
specialized three-judge district courts found in other legislation. 
This included the preclearance provisions of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and certain other provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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special category of cases in  which historical and 
contemporary practice demonstrates the wisdom of 
having three-judge district courts decide these cases.
The virtues of the three-judge district court 
process are particularly pronounced in  redistricting 
As compared to the typical three-tieredcases.
approach to federal court decision making, the three- 
judge court procedure, with  direct appeal to this 
Court, usually produces faster decisions in  an area in 
which quick resolution is needed so states may 
implement their new legislative maps for the next 
election. Moreover, both the litigants and the public 
may view a redistricting decision by a three-judge 
court as more accurate or legitimate because three 
judges—including one appellate judge—have come 
together to resolve the dispute. Similarly, having 
multiple judges decide a case that involves political 
issues can reduce the appearance or reality of 
ideology influencing the decision. See Douglas, 2011 
UTAH L. Rev. at 458-63 (highlighting timeliness, 
accuracy, mitigation of ideology, and legitimacy as 
virtues of the three-judge district court procedure for 
election law cases).
In  addition, modern redistricting litigation  often 
involves the use of sophisticated quantitative 
evidence and expert testimony. See D. James 
Greiner, The Quantitative Empirics of Redistricting 
Litigation: Knowledge, Threats to Knowledge, and the 
Need for Less Districting, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y Rev. 
527 (2011). There are thus benefits in  having three 
minds, rather than just one, available to consider and 
analyze this evidence. Indeed, experience with  the 
three-judge district court has shown that the
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threshold issues that single judges sometimes 
consider “are not invariably easy ones” and are often 
better suited for the fu ll three-judge panel. Currie, 
32 U. Ch i. L. Rev. at 23.3
I t  is also not surprising that, given the 
controversial and contested nature of most 
redistricting cases, three-judge district courts have a 
much higher rate of dissent than the typical three- 
judge panel on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. See 
Solimine, 30 U. MICH. J. L. Ref. at 139 tbl. 4 (noting 
that in  89 three-judge district court cases from 1976 
to 1994, there was a dissent in  22 of them). Indeed, 
both of the three-judge district court cases that this 
Court reviewed last Term were 2-1 decisions. See Ala. 
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 
2d 1227 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (three-judge court), vacated, 
135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015); Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. 
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047 
(D. Ariz. 2014) (three-judge court), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 
2652 (2015). Likewise, there is a much higher rate of 
appeal to this Court from three-judge district court 
decisions, as compared to the typical rate of appeal 
from decisions of a single district judge to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals. Solimine, 30 U. MICH. J. L. Ref. at
David P. Currie, the distinguished analyst of the history and 
practice of the three-judge district court, wondered on this 
point, in  a prescient way for the present case, whether a “single 
judge [should] have dismissed the suit to reapportion 
Tennessee’s legislature on the basis of Colegroue v Green?” 32 
U. CHI. L. Rev. at 23 (footnote omitted). He was referring to 
Baker u. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in which a three-judge 
district court was convened. 175 F. Supp. 649, 652 (M.D. Tenn. 
1959).
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99 (noting that up to 40 percent of three-judge 
district court decisions since 1976 have been 
appealed to this Court). These facts demonstrate the 
importance of a sustained three-judge court process.
Convening three-judge district courts in 
redistricting cases is also necessary to ensure that 
the law continues to develop. I f  plaintiffs could reach 
the three-judge court only by surviving a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiffs would fear 
immediate dismissal when presenting a novel legal 
argument or a plea to overrule prior precedent. Cf. 
FED. R. ClV. P. 11(b)(2) (noting that a lawyer may not 
be sanctioned for presenting a “nonfrivolous 
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 
existing law or for establishing new law”), 
purpose of the Three-Judge Court Act, however, was 
exactly the opposite—to ensure that the specific 
issues Congress identified as particularly important 
would receive fu ll consideration by multiple judges. 
See S. Rep. No. 94-204, at 4, 9, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1991, 1996 (explaining that
redistricting cases are “of such importance that they 
ought to be heard by a three-judge court and, in  any 
event, they have never constituted a large number of 
cases”); see also Currie, 32 U. CHI. L. Rev. at 24 
(highlighting the Court’s historical distinction in  the 
three-judge court context between dismissals for lack 
of jurisdiction, which a single judge may issue, and 
dismissals on the merits, which are reserved for the 
three-judge tribunal).
These advantages would largely disappear i f  a 
single judge had broad authority to dismiss a case on 
non-jurisdictional, merits-based grounds without
The
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allowing a three-judge district court to decide the 
dispute. A  case would take longer as i t  wades 
through the normal appellate process in  determining 
i f  the claim is actually frivolous, putting  off a decision 
on the merits as the election clock continues to tick. 
The resulting lengthy process could also compromise 
accuracy and legitimacy in  the very area in  which 
Congress believed three judges were better than one. 
And the process would lose the benefits of different 
viewpoints mitigating the fear of ideology in  a case 
involving politics.
Congress purposefully retained three-judge 
courts for redistricting cases to adhere to these policy 
goals. Allowing a single judge to dismiss a case on 
the merits without convening a three-judge court 
would undermine Congress’s well-considered choice.
C. The D is tr ic t  Court Judge’s Approach  
Raises Broader Policy  Concerns.
I f  the district court’s holding had been in  effect in  
other circuits, many important election law cases 
likely  would have never reached this Court—or at 
least would have taken much longer to make their 
way through the U.S. Court of Appeals process, 
hampering states’ ability  to administer their 
upcoming elections, 
redistricting cases deriving from three-judge district 
courts that this Court considered in  the previous 
Term, see Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 
135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015); Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. 
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015), 
other significant redistricting cases might never have 
received the needed clarification that this Court 
provided. See, e.g., Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934
In  addition to the two
;a
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(2012) (per curiam); League of United Latin  Am. 
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Cox v. Larios, 
542 U.S. 947 (Mem) (2004).4 The Court also would 
likely  not have had the same opportunity to resolve 
the important one person, one vote issue in  Euenwel 
v. Abbott, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (Mem) (2015), this Term. I f  
a single district judge can dismiss claims on the 
merits without referring them to a three-judge 
district court, then these cases, many of which asked 
the Court to overturn prior precedent, might have 
suffered premature dismissal without fu ll vetting by 
a three-judge court, with  direct appeal to this Court.
The consequences of the lower court’s holding in 
this case are stark. Under the district court’s view, a 
single district judge w ill be able to resolve the merits 
of a redistricting case without the benefit of 
convening a three-judge district court. A  p la in tiff can 
appeal that decision to the circuit court, and seek this 
Court’s review via a w rit of certiorari, but that path 
is fundamentally different from having the merits 
reviewed by a three-judge district court as an in itia l 
matter. Although a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
is entirely appropriate, and should be granted i f  
warranted, in  a redistricting case, e.g., Ariz. State 
Legislature, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1048, the appropriate
4 There are similar concerns for other election law cases that 
use the three-judge district court process, such as campaign 
finance or Voting Rights Act litigation. See, e.g., McCutcheon u. 
FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2013); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 551 
U.S. 193 (2009).
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tribunal to consider such a motion is a three-judge 
district court.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision and remand the case for consideration by a 
three-judge district court.
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